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Conceptions of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis
Financial Firms
Christopher M. Bruner*
I. INTRODUCTION
American “populism” has had a major impact on the development
of U.S. corporate governance throughout its history. Specifically, appeals
to the perceived interests of average working people have exerted enormous social and political influence over prevailing conceptions of corporate purpose—that is, the aims toward which society expects corporate
decision-making to be directed. In this Article, I assess the impact of
American populism upon prevailing conceptions of corporate purpose,
contrasting its unique expression in the context of financial firms with
that arising in other contexts. I then examine its impact upon corporate
governance reforms enacted in the wake of the financial and economic
crisis that emerged in 2007.
In Part II, I explore how populism has historically shaped conceptions of corporate purpose in the United States. I begin with nonfinancial firms, arguing that corporate law has long remained ambivalent
regarding the consistency of shareholders’ interests and incentives with
those of the broader public. The unique vulnerabilities of U.S. employees
relative to their counterparts in otherwise similar common law countries
have historically heightened this ambivalence. The consequence has been
substantial social and political pressure to constrain the power of U.S.
shareholders and to diminish their formal centrality to the corporate enterprise, toward the aim of enhancing firm sustainability.
I contrast these dynamics with those observed in the context of financial firms, where U.S. misgivings regarding shareholders have historically been even greater, reflecting not only the economic significance of
*
Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. Many thanks to Charles R.T.
O’Kelley and Marc Moore for organizing “Berle IV: The Future of Financial and Securities Markets.” For helpful comments and suggestions, I am grateful to Simon Deakin and to those attending
Berle IV and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools 2012 Annual Meeting panel on Recent
Developments in Corporate Governance. I am also grateful to the Frances Lewis Law Center at
Washington and Lee University School of Law for generous summer research support. All errors or
omissions are of course mine.
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financial firms, but also recognition of their shareholders’ greater inclination toward risk-taking. While the “employee” conceptual category best
encapsulates the perceived interests of average working people in the
non-financial context, the “depositor” conceptual category best encapsulates their perceived interests in the financial context. Accordingly,
American populism has long fostered strong emphasis on the interests of
bank depositors, resulting in remarkable corporate architectural strategies
aimed at ensuring firm sustainability in order to insulate depositors from
destabilizing social and economic shock. While foreclosing hostile takeovers has provided the clearest legal expression of populist pressure to
prioritize firm sustainability over shareholder interests in the nonfinancial context, foreclosing excessive risk-taking has provided its
clearest expression in the financial context—a goal historically pursued
not only through prudential regulation, but also by imposing heightened
fiduciary duties on directors and personal liability on shareholders.
In Part III, I turn to the crisis, arguing that growing shareholder centrism over recent decades goes a long way toward explaining excessive
risk-taking in financial firms—a conclusion rendering post-crisis reforms
aimed at further strengthening shareholders a surprising and alarming
development. While many have observed that the inherent challenges of
financial-firm management have grown substantially as financial firms
and their products alike have grown larger, more complex, and increasingly opaque, far fewer have acknowledged that corporate architectural
strategies that historically constrained risk-taking in U.S. banks were effectively marginalized, or discarded entirely, in parallel with those developments. The trend over recent decades toward full-service financial
firms with publicly traded stock has placed greater emphasis on generating returns for financial firm shareholders while simultaneously blurring
corporate law’s historical distinction between financial and non-financial
firms. The results have been stronger incentives to engage in financial
risk-taking and a weaker capacity to limit it through corporate law.
Our increasingly shareholder-centric conception of the purpose of
financial firms has greatly constrained our sense of the possible in the
wake of the crisis. While traditional American populism has remained a
powerful political force, it has expressed itself differently in this new
environment, fueling a post-crisis narrative that has actually facilitated
shareholder empowerment not only in today’s highly diversified financial mega-firms, but in all public companies. Widespread outrage over
managerial recklessness dovetailed with populist sympathy for hard-hit
“middle class” working families, effectively merging traditional “shareholder” and “employee” concerns regarding the stability of retirement
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funds and job-linked social welfare benefits into a powerful anti-manager
political coalition.
That post-crisis populism would express itself in shareholdercentric corporate governance reforms demonstrates just how narrow and
ossified our sense of corporate purpose has become and the degree to
which we have lost sight of the relationship between limited liability and
risk-taking in corporate governance. Armed with a diminished vocabulary for describing the relationship between corporate governance and
financial risk—and correlatively, a much smaller conceptual toolbox for
constraining excessive risk-taking through corporate law—we have
found ourselves unable to tackle a set of problems requiring the ability to
think creatively about how the corporate architecture ought to be structured. The result has been a crisis narrative and corresponding corporate
governance reforms that not only fail to acknowledge the role of equity
market pressures toward excessive risk-taking in financial firms, but also
reinforce such pressures moving forward.
I conclude in Part IV that the potential corporate governance reforms most worthy of consideration include those aimed at accomplishing precisely the opposite: insulating financial-firm management from
equity-market pressures and associated risk incentives. This may well
require resurrecting corporate architectural strategies embraced in the
past. Notably, such strategies include imposing more robust fiduciary
duties upon financial firm directors, while at the same time imposing
some measure of personal liability for financial firm losses upon the
shareholders themselves—including directors, officers, and employees
receiving equity-based pay. As a threshold matter, however, we must
first grapple effectively with a more fundamental and pressing social and
political problem. Until we firmly combat the growing popular misconception that financial firms exist merely to maximize stock prices for the
short-term benefit of their shareholders, we will at best fail to address the
core problem, and at worst endure similar crises in the future.
II. AMERICAN POPULISM AND CORPORATE PURPOSE
Populism has long exerted substantial influence over U.S. corporate
law—including prevailing conceptions of corporate purpose—but has
manifested itself in different ways in financial and non-financial contexts, respectively. In this part of the Article, I contrast these differing
manifestations of populism in U.S. corporate law, focusing particularly
on remarkable corporate architectural strategies aimed at foreclosing excessive risk-taking in financial firms as a means of ensuring their sustainability.
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A. Corporate Law’s Ambivalence Regarding Shareholders
Ambivalence regarding corporate purpose—most notably with respect to the governance role of shareholders and the centrality of their
interests in corporate decision-making—has long been a defining feature
of U.S. corporate law. 1 Undoubtedly, the core governance structure of
the corporation favors shareholders over other corporate stakeholders in
real and meaningful ways. For example, in Delaware (the jurisdiction of
incorporation for most U.S. public companies), 2 it is the shareholders
who are empowered to elect the board of directors, 3 to ratify charter
amendments and fundamental transactions, 4 and to advance corporate
claims in certain circumstances through so-called “derivative” suits. 5
Shareholders even possess some (unspecified) degree of unilateral power
to alter governance rules through the corporation’s bylaws.6
Notwithstanding their special status, however, a number of aspects
of U.S. corporate law cast doubt on the claim that the corporation’s singular purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth. Under the business
judgment rule, courts generally will not second-guess unconflicted business decisions. As the Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized,
“[c]ourts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments . . . .
Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.”7 This hands-off
posture effectively gives the board of directors substantial discretion to
deviate from strict shareholder centrism in day-to-day business affairs, as

1. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008).
2. See Del. Div. of Corps., Why Choose Delaware as Your Corporate Home?, STATE OF
DELAWARE, http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last updated Jan. 2, 2013).
3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (West 2009).
4. Id. §§ 242(b) (charter amendments), 251(b)–(c) (mergers), 271(a) (sales of substantially all
assets).
5. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004) (explaining that the derivative suit “enables a stockholder to bring suit on behalf of the corporation for
harm done to the corporation”); see also N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 102–03 (Del. 2007) (holding that creditors have derivative standing only
once the corporation is insolvent).
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (West 2009). On the shareholders’ murky authority to enact,
amend, and repeal bylaws, see generally Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism:
The Least-Bad Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2011).
7. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984) (describing the business judgment rule as “a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company”), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
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a growing body of scholarship has recognized.8 That discretion, then, is
strongly reinforced by corporate statutes rendering it relatively difficult
to remove U.S. directors. Unlike in the United Kingdom, where public
company shareholders with five percent voting power can call meetings
and directors can be removed by ordinary resolution of a simple majority, 9 Delaware shareholders possess no default power to call meetings
and, if the board has been “staggered” into multiple classes (elected in
successive years), cause is required to remove directors unless the charter
provides otherwise.10
Most revealingly, however, U.S. boards are given explicit discretion to deviate from the shareholders’ interests in the context where they
most sharply diverge from those of other stakeholders: hostile-takeover
bids. Many states have adopted “other constituency” statutes permitting
boards to bring the interests of employees, creditors, and other stakeholders to bear in determining how to respond to a hostile takeover bid.11
Delaware is not among them, but the Delaware courts have nevertheless
constructed an elaborate case law giving target boards substantial discretion to employ defensive measures, including by reference to the interests of non-shareholder constituencies. 12 While the Delaware Supreme
Court has imposed a duty to maximize short-term returns to shareholders
in a sale, break-up, or change of control,13 this duty is in fact quite limited; whether there is to be a sale, break-up, or change of control is itself
largely within the target board’s discretion. Critically, it is the board’s
prerogative to determine the timeframe for the pursuit of corporate strategy, which permits a target board to maintain takeover defenses as a
means of safeguarding its own long-term strategy for the company, even
where this flies in the face of the shareholders’ clear wishes.14
To be sure, a strong emphasis on generating returns for shareholders has increasingly animated U.S. corporate governance (a tendency to

8. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299–309 (1999); Bruner, supra note 1, at 1402, 1411–12, 1424–27; Einer
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 770–75 (2005).
9. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 168, 282, 303, 304 (U.K.).
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(d), 141(k)(1), 211(d) (West 2009). For a comparison of the
U.S. corporate governance regime with the considerably more shareholder-centric U.K. regime, see
generally Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50
VA. J. INT’L L. 579 (2010).
11. See Bruner, supra note 1, at 1420–21.
12. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).
13. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986);
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43–44 (Del. 1994).
14. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149–55 (Del. 1990). For
additional discussion of Delaware’s approach to hostile takeovers, see Bruner, supra note 1, at
1415–18; Bruner, supra note 10, at 596–99.
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which I return below).15 It does so, however, as a market norm, not a legal rule. As Lynn Stout has aptly put it, shareholder centrism is “an ideology, not a legal requirement or a practical necessity of modern business
life.”16 In the United States, shareholder-wealth maximization is, at most,
a heuristic aid to corporate decision-making—a proxy for the public
good. But to say this is to suggest that it can be displaced by reference to
some other norm. While U.S. corporate law remains notoriously ambiguous on this point, the case law (including in Delaware) suggests a more
fundamental norm that trumps shareholder-wealth maximization when
these norms directly conflict: sustainability of the corporate enterprise.17
This is why, for example, boards are empowered to maintain defenses in
hostile-takeover bids. When push comes to shove, sustaining the enterprise for the good of all stakeholders has been deemed more important
than generating premiums for shareholders.
The degree to which U.S. corporate law empowers boards to prioritize sustainability becomes clearer when this approach is set beside that
embraced in other countries, including those with which we have the
strongest legal, economic, and cultural ties. The U.S. corporate governance regime differs quite markedly from those of Australia, Canada, and
the United Kingdom, all of which expressly place greater emphasis on
shareholders’ interests, and give shareholders substantially more governance power than we do. While there are numerous potential explanations
for the greater shareholder centrism of these other common law jurisdictions, a critical factor driving this divergence is the complex interaction
of corporate law with other regulatory fields that affect the interests of
other corporate stakeholders. Just as corporate law affects the internal
organization of corporations, the broader political economy affects the
internal organization of corporate law. It is through this lens that our
greater ambivalence regarding shareholders begins to come into focus.18
15. See infra Parts III–IV.
16. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 3 (2012); see also Elhauge, supra note 8, at
738 (“None of the fifty states has a statute that imposes a duty to profit-maximize or that makes
profit-maximization the sole purpose of the corporation.”). This again contrasts starkly with U.K.
company law, which expressly favors the shareholders’ interests by statute. See Companies Act,
2006, c. 46, § 172 (U.K.).
17. See Bruner, supra note 1, at 1427–32; see also Simon Deakin, The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37
QUEEN’S L.J. 339, 367–80 (2012) (characterizing the corporation as a “commons,” with various
areas of law, including corporate law, at once “specifying the conditions under which various contributors of inputs . . . can draw on the resources of the firm while at the same time preserving and
sustaining the firm’s asset pool as a source of productive value”).
18. For a detailed comparative study of social and political drivers leading the United States
and the United Kingdom to diverge in this manner, see generally Bruner, supra note 10. For a broader comparative study of the U.S. divergence from the more shareholder-centric approaches of Aus-
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The United Kingdom, for example, has long embraced a takeover
regime giving shareholders near-total control over the success or failure
of hostile bids—an approach substantially expanded and reinforced in
the 1960s under a Labour government, notwithstanding the apparent tension with the interests of the Labour Party’s core constituency. As I have
argued elsewhere, this development reflected the belief among Labour
leaders at that time that industrial consolidation through takeovers would
improve Britain’s international competitiveness and that the post-war
welfare state and labor law protections were sufficient to buffer the
downsides for employees. In other words, takeovers appeared to offer
substantial benefits at manageable costs given Britain’s economic circumstances and broader regulatory framework at the time. Conversely,
the United States adopted a stakeholder-centric takeover regime in the
1980s, during the ascendance of the modern political right. This development reflected the fact that, unlike in 1960s Britain, takeovers were
not widely viewed in 1980s America as offering broader social and economic benefits. Additionally, social welfare and labor law protections
were not deemed sufficient to buffer the downsides for American employees, who, unlike their British counterparts, stood to lose their access
to healthcare and other job-linked social welfare benefits should they be
fired in a subsequent consolidation. Thus, because takeovers appeared to
offer minimal benefits at unmanageable costs (reflecting our own unique
political economy and the unique social and political consequences of
strongly favoring shareholder interests in the United States), we constrained such transactions, and the shareholders’ governance power more
generally, through corporate law.19
B. Heightened Ambivalence Regarding Financial Firm Shareholders
To this point, I have ascribed U.S. corporate law’s ambivalence regarding shareholders primarily to social and political concerns for the
welfare of other constituencies—dynamics most vividly reflected in the
degree to which U.S. courts and legislatures have empowered boards to
sustain the corporate enterprise as a means of insulating vulnerable employees, in particular, from the destabilizing effects of corporate consolidation. This argument would appear to fit quite comfortably with certain
types of corporate enterprises, like manufacturers with large work forces
tralia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, see CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (forthcom-

ing 2013).
19. See Bruner, supra note 10, at 621–43; see also BRUNER, supra note 18, ch. 5 (further describing these divergent social and political conditions and detailing Australian and Canadian social
welfare dynamics broadly resembling those in the United Kingdom).
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heavily invested in firm-specific (and thus relatively immobile) skills.20
But what about financial firms, which do not fit this description,21 yet
raise unique social and political concerns of their own? As I describe
below, issues of corporate purpose have arisen in a related, though distinct, manner in the context of financial firms, where our ambivalence
regarding shareholders has, if anything, historically been even greater
than in non-financial contexts.22
One of the first intriguing insights to arise in the wake of the 2007
financial crisis was the realization that, as recently as 2009, the empirical
literature on corporate governance in financial firms was quite thin. 23
This is surprising because courts and regulators have long viewed corporate governance in banks differently and for good reasons. As a threshold
matter, the economic role of these firms differs. Banks and other financial firms perform a capital-allocation function that is central to the efficiency of a capitalist economy. Accordingly, the social and economic
stakes of their governance, and the costs of their failure, are quite high.24
Thus it is hardly surprising that U.S. courts and regulators have long taken a keen interest in bank governance, even going so far as to characterize them as “quasi public institutions.”25
The differing nature of these firms also introduces unique governance challenges. Fundamentally, banks are in the business of “maturity
transformation,” making short-term money useful for long-term purposes. This critically important financial function is also an inherently unstable one because the balance-sheet mismatch between long-term assets
and short-term liabilities naturally leaves them vulnerable to “bank
20. Recall that such concerns have motivated criticism of hostile takeovers. See generally
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). Legal structures empowering the board to sustain the corporate enterprise have likewise prompted “team production” theorists’
conceptualization of the board as a “mediating hierarch” empowered to prevent various stakeholders
making firm-specific investments from exploiting one another. See generally Blair & Stout, supra
note 8.
21. See STOUT, supra note 16, at 84–85 (“Nor do finance employees invest much in firmspecific human capital. Goldman Sachs investment bankers and Morgan Stanley traders can easily
take their skills and their client relationships to other banks, and often do . . . .”).
22. See infra Part II.C.2.
23. See Renée Adams, Governance and the Financial Crisis 5 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Finance Working Paper No. 284/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1398583 (recognizing the limitations of the extant literature); Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 259 (2009) (same); see also Renée Adams & Hamid
Mehran, Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV.
123, 123 (2003) (same); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of
Banks, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 91, 91 (2003) (same).
24 . See, e.g., Adams & Mehran, supra note 23, at 124; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 ( 2010).
25. See, e.g., Campbell v. Watson, 50 A. 120, 124 (N.J. Ch. 1901).
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runs.”26 The fact that financial risk is their very stock-in-trade renders
their assets and liabilities particularly abstract and difficult to value.27
As a consequence of their distinct nature and economic role, the
relevant corporate stakeholders in banks have long been conceptualized
differently as well. While banks have boards, officers, employees, shareholders, and creditors just like other types of corporate entities, banks
also have a unique category of creditors thought to alter the governance
equation in a fundamental way–depositors. Unlike typical creditors, bank
depositors are poorly positioned to monitor bank governance for at least
a few reasons. Depositors often lack the financial sophistication and information required to monitor effectively—a problem exacerbated by the
complex and abstract nature of a bank’s assets and liabilities. Moreover,
the advent of deposit insurance, directed at resolving the problem of bank
runs, further undermines depositors’ monitoring incentives because they
know that they are covered no matter what becomes of the bank in question.28 The analogue of this moral hazard problem for non-bank financial
firms is, of course, the “too big to fail” problem—in which implicit government guarantees through bailouts undermine monitoring incentives in
a manner closely resembling that of deposit insurance in commercial
banks.29
The upshot is that while we have traditionally envisioned corporate
creditors as sophisticated parties well-positioned both to protect themselves contractually and to provide robust monitoring of management’s
performance, in financial firms—and particularly banks—we have traditionally envisioned exactly the opposite. Depositors have historically
been characterized as ordinary people who lack financial sophistication
26. See Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP.
L. 309, 311–12 (2011); Macey & O’Hara, supra note 23, at 97; Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen
O’Hara, Solving the Corporate Governance Problems of Banks: A Proposal, 120 BANKING L.J. 326,
326 (2003).
27. See GROUP OF THIRTY, TOWARD EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 46
(2012) (“Financial risk of some form, or a means of hedging it, is a key ingredient of every service
or product offered by . . . [a financial institution], a characteristic that distinguishes . . . [financial
institutions] from other types of business.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk
Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 982 (2009) (“Devising effective enterprise risk management programs has been a particular challenge for the board of directors of ‘complex risk-taking organizations such as banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and energy companies’ . . . .”); Kristin N.
Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 61–65 (2011) (“The business activities of financial institutions
engender unique risk concerns. In addition to facing risks common to all businesses, the principal
commercial activities of financial institutions also entail risks associated with sophisticated investment decisions.”); Macey & O’Hara, supra note 26, at 326 (observing that, among other things, “the
opacity of [bank] balance sheets” creates “unique challenges regarding corporate governance”).
28. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 312; Macey & O’Hara, supra note 26, at 326–27.
29. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 315.
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or otherwise remain poorly positioned to monitor bank management effectively30—hence the perceived need for regulators to serve as substitute
monitors and to protect depositors from faithless or reckless managers.31
At the same time, however, this differing conceptualization of bank
creditors has, in turn, led to a differing conceptualization of bank shareholders. Shareholders in any corporate entity naturally favor risk-taking
more than other constituencies do because limited liability allows them
to capture the upside while avoiding much of the downside.32 Due to the
peculiar monitoring problems described above, however, the shareholders’ inclination toward risk has long been thought to be heightened in
financial firms because an impediment to risk-taking has effectively been
removed, resulting in correlatively greater concerns among judges and
legislators alike regarding pressure from shareholders to engage in riskier
business practices.33
These differing conceptualizations of financial firms and their
stakeholders have long loomed large in U.S. law, which historically responded not only with prudential regulation, but also with conscious deviation from what is today regarded as the traditional corporate architecture.34 Fiduciary duties have long been applied differently in U.S. banks.
While the traditional formulation suggests that fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty are owed “to the corporation and its stockholders”35(a decidedly ambivalent and malleable formulation, to be sure),36 by the early
twentieth century, some courts were already expressly suggesting that
30. See Patricia A. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgment Rule in Banking:
Implications for Corporate Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4, 72–73 (1996) (observing the differing characterization of bank depositors relative to typical corporate creditors).
31. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 312; Macey & O’Hara, supra note 26, at 326–30.
32. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 317 (discussing the empirical literature).
33. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders:
History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 31–39 (1992); Macey & O’Hara, supra note
26, at 326–33; McCoy, supra note 30, at 1–22; see also PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW
MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS §
14.01 (2d ed. 2012) (further observing that “the ratio of shareholders’ equity to debt in the form of
deposits is relatively low, allowing shareholders to leverage proportionately greater gains and to shift
proportionately greater losses onto depositors and the deposit insurance funds”).
34. In referring to “what is today regarded as the traditional corporate architecture,” I have in
mind the typical summary of core corporate attributes regularly recited in treatises and casebooks:
limited liability for shareholders; free transferability of shares; legal personality; and centralized
management through a board of directors owing a duty of loyalty to the corporation and the shareholders. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN,
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 83–109 (2d ed. 2007);
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 1–34 (1986).
35. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99
(Del. 2007); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
36. See Bruner, supra note 1, at 1425–26; Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the
Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 900, 923–24 (1990).

2013]

Conceptions of Corporate Purpose

537

bank directors ought to show regard not only for the corporation as an
entity, and its stockholders in particular, but also for its “depositors” and
even “the general public.”37 The Court of Chancery of New Jersey suggested in 1901 that directors “are not only trustees for the corporation,
but also, though, perhaps in a modified sense, for the creditors of the
corporation, who become such by depositing their money with the
bank.”38 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals explained in 1909
that “[a] banking corporation occupies a different relation to the public,
in that it invites individuals to submit to it the possession and care of
their money and property.”39 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
stated in 1917 that bank boards “must exercise at least proper diligence
to see that the officers and agents do their duty for the protection of creditors, stockholders, and the public generally.”40 A year later, the court
further explained that bank directors “are liable to stockholders, as well
as depositors, for its losses from their negligence in not knowing its condition and seeing that its affairs are honestly and properly managed.”41
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in 1933, rejected the contention that, while the bank and the stockholders benefit from an “ordinary
care” standard, depositors must establish “some malicious or fraudulent
act, or at the least, . . . gross negligence” because they are “but creditors
of the corporation and utter strangers to the obligations of the directors to
it.”42 Rather, the court held “without hesitation” that the same care standard applied to bank directors “in the protection of their depositors.”43 In a
similar spirit, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated in
1935 that bank directors “invite the confidence of the depositing public
and must afford the protection thereby implied.”44
Notwithstanding broader trends to the contrary in more recent
times,45 such formulations are not limited to the distant past. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, for example, writing in 1993,
stated that bank directors “owe a high degree of duty to the general public and stockholders.”46 Likewise, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York stated in 2002 that the business judgment rule
37. See McCoy, supra note 30, at 38–39; see also 1C MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING, ch. 3,
at 44, 52, 125–27, 201–17 (2010 ed.).
38. Campbell v. Watson, 50 A. 120, 124 (N.J. Ch. 1901).
39. Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co. of New York, 89 N.E. 476, 482 (N.Y. 1909).
40. Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 196 S.W. 803, 808 (Ark. 1917).
41. Magale v. Fomby, 201 S.W. 278, 279 (Ark. 1918).
42. Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501, 505–06 (Va. 1933).
43. Id. at 506.
44. Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649, 655 (Mass. 1935).
45. See infra Parts III–IV.
46. FDIC v. Appling, 992 F.2d 1109, 1113–14 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hoehn v. Crews, 144
F.2d 665, 672 (10th Cir. 1944)).
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“has not generally been found to apply to bank directors,” explaining that
“bank directors were traditionally held to a higher standard of diligence
because of the quasi-public role of financial institutions in safekeeping
the public’s funds.”47 Similarly broad formulations of a bank director’s
obligations naturally remain popular among prudential regulators as well.
A Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) policy statement indicates that “[d]irectors and officers of banks have obligations to discharge
duties owed to their institution and to the shareholders and creditors of
their institutions, and to comply with federal and state statutes, rules, and
regulations.” 48 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision likewise
states that “in addition to their responsibilities to shareholders, banks also
have a responsibility to their depositors and to other recognised stakeholders” (while acknowledging that the “legal and regulatory system in a
country determines the formal responsibilities a bank has” to various
constituencies).49
At the same time, courts have applied a heightened standard of care
to bank directors and have shown greater willingness to scrutinize managerial decision-making and impose personal liability for losses. In nonfinancial firms, directors virtually never face personal liability for care
breaches due to the business judgment rule, which ordinarily precludes
liability for unconflicted business decisions that can be ascribed to a rational business purpose. 50 In Delaware, this standard has been said to
require a showing of “gross negligence” before liability could be imposed upon directors for a breach of the duty of care.51 In banking, however, courts and legislatures have at times imposed a more exacting
47. FDIC v. Bober, No. 95 Civ. 9529 (JSM), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13231, at *5–8 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 8, 2002) (applying New York law).
48. Statement Concerning the Responsibilities of Bank Directors and Officers, FDIC, http://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3300.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2009).
49. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 24, at 5–6. The Basel Committee
“formulates broad [banking] supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends statements of
best practice in the expectation that individual authorities will take steps to implement them through
detailed arrangements . . . best suited to their own national systems.” The Committee’s member
countries—including the United States—“are represented by their central bank and also by the authority with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision of banking business where this is not
the central bank.” History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
50. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
51. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). Today, the business judgment rule’s insulation of
director discretion is of course bolstered by statutory structures, notably exculpation statutes permitting corporations to eliminate monetary liability for care breaches through their charters. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2009). For additional background on the duty of care, the
business judgment rule, and statutory exculpation in Delaware, see Christopher M. Bruner, Good
Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1131–50 (2006).

2013]

Conceptions of Corporate Purpose

539

standard of conduct on directors, largely for the protection of depositors.52 As Patricia McCoy explains, “courts curtailed the business judgment rule in banking long before federal deposit insurance was adopted”—a doctrinal shift made “in reaction to profligate lending practices
that wiped out depositors and triggered bank runs.”53 The result was “an
unprecedented negligence cause of action in favor of depositors, who
formed the most visible class of debtholders in banks.”54 As the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey stated in 1901, a bank depositor has
a right to rely upon the character of the directors and officers of the
bank, and that they will perform their sworn duty to manage the affairs of the bank according to law and devote to its affairs the same
diligent attention which ordinary, prudent, diligent men pay to their
own affairs . . . .

The court added that this standard requires “such diligence and attention
as experience has shown it is proper and necessary that bank directors
should give to that business in order to reasonably protect the bank and
its creditors against loss.”55 In 1933, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia similarly refused to require depositors, unlike shareholders and
the bank, to establish “gross negligence” in suits alleging board oversight
52. See McCoy, supra note 30, at 38–43, 48–55; see also MCCOY, supra note 33, § 14.04[2]–
[3], [6]; Macey & O’Hara, supra note 26, at 333–37. Following the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), passed in response to the savings and loan crisis
of the 1980s, federal law provides that directors and officers of an insured depository institution can
be held monetarily liable for “gross negligence” in an FDIC action, permitting states to impose
stricter, but not more lenient, standards of conduct. See MCCOY, supra note 33, § 14.04[2][a]–[b];
see also 1-6 KENNETH M. LAPINE ET AL., BANKING LAW § 6.04 (2012); JOHN K. VILLA, BANK
DIRECTORS’, OFFICERS’, AND LAWYERS’ CIVIL LIABILITIES § 1.02[A] (2012). In February 2012, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found that a failed bank’s exculpatory charter provision did not apply to a suit filed by the FDIC as the bank’s receiver. Georgia’s business
corporation statute permits exculpation of liability “to the corporation or its shareholders,” but for
Georgia banks, exculpation applies only to liability “to the shareholders of the bank.” The court
found that the FDIC, as receiver, acted as successor to the bank, not as a shareholder. See FDIC v.
Skow, Civ. No. 1:11-CV-0111-SCJ, at *1–14 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2012); see also Joseph E. Finley et
al., Jones Day, FDIC Failed Bank Director and Officer Claims – Recent Court Decisions Better
Define the Landscape, MONDAQ (Mar. 22, 2012), available at http://www.mondaq.com/
unitedstates/x/169776/Capital+Markets/FDIC+Failed+Bank+Director+and+Officer+Claims+Recent
+Court+Decisions+Better+Define+The+Landscape.
53. McCoy, supra note 30, at 3.
54. Id. McCoy emphasizes “the watershed case of Briggs v. Spaulding,” an 1891 U.S. Supreme
Court decision that applied to national bank directors a tort-based duty of care requiring ordinary
prudence. Id. at 35–43; see also VILLA, supra note 52, § 1.02[B]–[D]. While “the federal common
law basis of Briggs did not survive Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,” and “state law, not federal
common law, [now] provides the rule of decision in bank director liability cases,” the Briggs approach “remains highly influential and has been incorporated into state law standards.” For a federally chartered bank, the applicable corporate law is that of the state where the bank is headquartered.
MCCOY, supra note 33, § 14.04[2][a]–[b].
55. Campbell v. Watson, 50 A. 120, 124 (N.J. Ch. 1901).
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failures, concluding that “the protection of their depositors” required that
directors be held to a standard of “ordinary care” in depositor suits as
well.56 Likewise, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explained
in 1935 that bank directors “are bound to exercise ordinary prudence and
skill to care for and invest the money entrusted to the bank.” The court
continued,
For errors of judgment while acting with integrity, ‘skill and prudence, . . . they are not to be held liable; but they cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their misconduct or of their
ignorance or negligence by averring that they have failed merely to
exercise ordinary skill, care and vigilance.’57

A more remarkable deviation from the traditional corporate architecture arose on the shareholder side of the governance equation in the
form of multiple liability rules. This approach aimed to protect depositors by modifying the core structural attribute of corporate equity that
otherwise led bank shareholders to crave risk, thus directly attacking the
fundamental impetus for excessive risk-taking. Under multiple liability
statutes—or in some cases, state constitutional provisions—if a bank
failed, the shareholders lost not only the money initially invested when
they purchased their stock, but also some additional multiple of that invested amount (assessed by the court at the behest of the failed bank’s
receiver). Most were so-called “double liability” statutes; for example, a
shareholder who had initially paid $100 for the stock could be assessed
an additional $100 for the benefit of creditors upon the bank’s failure.
This was the rule for national banks from the 1860s until the 1930s, by
which point it was the rule for most state banks as well.58 The strategy
was elegantly straightforward: curb the shareholders’ enthusiasm for risk
by forcing them to absorb more losses. As Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey
Miller put it, a double liability statute “transforms shareholders from investors seeking to advantage themselves at the expense of other investors
by increasing the riskiness of the banks in which they have invested into
investors who benefit themselves by decreasing the riskiness of these
firms.”59
56. Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501, 505–06 (Va. 1933).
57. Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649, 655 (Mass. 1935).
58. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 35–39.
59. Id. at 33. For additional background on double liability statutes, see generally Howell E.
Jackson, Losses From National Bank Failures During the Great Depression: A Response to Professors Macey and Miller, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 919 (1993) (questioning Macey and Miller’s data
on losses following bank failures in the 1930s); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double
Liability of Bank Shareholders: A Look at the New Data, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 933 (1993)
(replying to Jackson); see also DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE
ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 93, 97–100, 115 (2002); Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liabil-
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As remarkable as such incursions upon the sanctity of limited liability may seem today, this approach qualitatively resembles the principal
constraint on risk-taking that prevailed in investment banks as late as the
1980s: the partnership organizational form. As general partners, investment bankers were exposed to unlimited personal liability for the firms’
losses, creating a strong incentive to police very carefully the admission
of new equity owners, as well as the nature and scope of financial risks
undertaken in the firm’s name.60 As Claire Hill and Richard Painter explain, while investment banks “were not regulated for safety and soundness” like commercial banks were, “there may have been little need for
such oversight” because liability rules effectively did the work. “A partner of Lehman Brothers did not want or need the government to tell him
how to run his business; if the business failed, the partner paid.” In the
extreme, “[f]irms that did not exercise restraint failed in the next market
downturn and they took their improvident partners with them.”61
C. Populism and Corporate Governance
To this point I have emphasized how financial firms differ from
non-financial firms—specifically, how the distinct nature and economic
role of financial firms, and consequent differences in the conceptualization of various corporate stakeholders, have led to heightened concerns
regarding excessive risk-taking and innovative efforts to protect depositors by imposing fiduciary constraints on boards and personal liability on
shareholders. At a certain level of abstraction, however, there is a strong
commonality with non-financial firms in terms of how issues of corporate purpose have arisen and how they have been addressed in U.S. corporate law.
The common thread unifying the dynamics described above, across
financial and non-financial contexts alike, can be expressed in a single
word: “populism.” In using this term, I refer generally to social and politity, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 458–59 (2012); Joseph M. Leonard, Superadded Liability of Bank Stockholders, 14 TEMP. L.Q. 522 (1940); Macey & O’Hara, supra note 26, 330–33. Australia, Canada, and
the United Kingdom employed various multiple liability regimes as well. See generally Lewis T.
Evans & Neil C. Quigley, Shareholder Liability Regimes, Principal-Agent Relationships, and Banking Industry Performance, 38 J.L. & ECON. 497 (1995); John D. Turner, ‘The Last Acre and Sixpence’: Views on Bank Liability Regimes in Nineteenth-Century Britain, 16 FIN. HIST. REV. 111
(2009).
60. See Conti-Brown, supra note 59, at 459–60; Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision
Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1175–78 (2010); Michael Lewis, The End, UPSTART (Nov. 11, 2008),
http://upstart.bizjournals.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-WallStreets-Boom.html; see also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15 (1914) (reflecting the personal liability of
general partners).
61. Hill & Painter, supra note 60, at 1177.
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ical appeals to the perceived interests of average working people—a
force that has proven highly consequential in periods of corporate governance reform, and periods of broader financial regulatory reform,
throughout American history.62 To facilitate the discussion of post-crisis
reform dynamics that follows, I explore, in the remainder of this section,
how populist concerns for broader social welfare have historically affected corporate governance structures in non-financial and financial contexts, respectively.
1. Non-Financial Firms: Protecting “Employees”
In the non-financial context, hostile takeovers have most clearly reflected corporate law’s ambivalence regarding shareholders because these transactions drive such an enormous wedge between the interests of
shareholders and those of other stakeholders. In response, U.S. courts
and legislators permitted deployment of powerful defenses like poison
pills,63 enabling target boards to prioritize firm sustainability over returns
to shareholders. As discussed above, this move responded to the unique
vulnerability of U.S. employees to the loss of job-linked social welfare
benefits in a subsequent consolidation.64
In this episode, we see corporate law driven by powerful external
political forces, which reflect the fundamental aim of insulating average
working people from destabilizing social and economic shock—the
“populist” impulse in American politics. For example, the preamble to a
1987 amendment to North Carolina’s business combination statute observed that takeovers were “occurring with increasing frequency”; that
such transactions could “be highly disruptive to communities . . . by
causing, among other things, high unemployment and erosion of the state
and local economy and tax base”; and that potentially vulnerable targets
“provide their North Carolina employees with health, retirement and oth-

62. I have used the term populism similarly elsewhere, as have others. See Bruner, supra note
26, at 332–39; MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 29 (1994) (using the term “to refer to a widespread attitude that
large institutions and accumulations of centralized economic power are inherently undesirable”);
McCoy, supra note 30, at 4 n.7 (using the term to refer to “a way of thinking that identifies
debtholders or depositors with individuals of modest means and champions their interests against the
interests of larger corporate entities”).
63. Poison pills, typically called “shareholder rights plans,” effectively shut down hostile bids
by threatening would-be bidders with substantial dilution should they exceed a specified ownership
threshold (often ten to fifteen percent) without the target board’s approval. Doing so would trigger
“rights” attached to the shares, permitting all shareholders but the would-be bidder to buy deeply
discounted stock. See ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 34, at 536–39.
64. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
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er benefits.”65 Such concerns for employee welfare were entirely justified
given the degree to which state-based social welfare programs were
scaled back in the United States during the 1980s and the correlative degree to which employees depended on their jobs for access to such benefits.66 As Mark Roe concludes, “[p]opulist sentiment helped fuel the antitakeover legislation at the end of the 1980s.”67 Hostile takeovers, he explains, “disrupt the lives of managers and workers,” and “[t]he public
sympathized with workers displaced by manipulators from Wall Street.”
Indeed, according to a 1987 Harris poll, “58 percent of those polled
thought hostile takeovers did more harm than good; only 8 percent
thought hostile takeovers were beneficial.” In this light, “laws restricting
hostile takeovers were predictable.”68
Delaware has addressed takeovers principally through case law,69
though it would be a mistake to conclude on that basis that populist politics played no role. Antitakeover statutes generally raised the cost of
takeovers without precluding them outright. As Roe explains, however,
the key move probably was when states validated the poison pill,
which can be a show-stopper. Since the key move validating the
poison pill was judicial and judges are often seen as above politics, I
do not think it is usually seen, as it should be, as part of takeover
politics. . . . But because legislatures could reverse the judicial decisions, there is a public choice structure to the emergence and survival of the poison pill—the takeover show-stopper—as well.70

Delaware’s takeover case law is, as Roe suggests, at least indirectly political insofar as the survival of controversial defenses like poison pills
requires legislative acquiescence. However, Delaware’s takeover decisions are intrinsically policy-laden in their own right and Delaware’s
judges are fully aware of it. Former Delaware Chancellor William Allen,
then-Vice Chancellor (now Justice) Jack Jacobs, and then-Vice Chancellor (now Chancellor) Leo Strine, in a 2002 law review article, observed
that Delaware’s statute has “rarely been the method used to confront the
major developments occurring in the mergers and acquisitions market65. See David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 903, 922–23 (1988) (quoting 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 124).
66. See Bruner, supra note 10, at 639–40.
67. ROE, supra note 62, at 32.
68. Id. at 152–53. Roe further observes that antitakeover statutes often arose in response to a
particular takeover bid—as in the case of North Carolina. See id. at 161.
69. Delaware’s statute does in fact include a business combination provision. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (West 2009). This provision includes several exceptions, however, and is thought
to be “fairly mild as anti-takeover statutes go.” See ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra
note 34, at 609 n.59.
70. ROE, supra note 62, at 160–61.
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place during the last thirty years,” creating a “legislative vacuum” requiring courts to create “legal rules [that] involve policy choices.” They candidly concede that “[j]udges presented with takeover cases are unavoidably aware that the interests of more than stockholders are usually at
stake,” and recognize as “credibly arguable that an approach that locates
these decisions in the hands of directors” may effectively balance shareholder and stakeholder interests.71
This perspective was fully in evidence in the Delaware Supreme
Court’s 1985 Unocal opinion, which stated that in determining how to
respond to a hostile bid, the target board may legitimately consider “the
nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise,” including “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally).”72 It was equally apparent in the court’s 1990 Paramount v. Time
decision, which cited to Unocal’s “constituencies” language in support of
its conclusion that a target board with an articulable long-term strategy
may maintain its defenses and simply refuse to negotiate with a hostile
bidder, even in the face of an all-cash, all-shares, premium bid.73
The upshot is that, whether emerging from legislatures or courts,
U.S. corporate law on takeovers reflects strong concerns for the welfare
of non-shareholder constituencies, particularly employees—the conceptual category best encapsulating the perceived interests and vulnerabilities of average working people in non-financial firms. In the context
where the interests of shareholders and other constituencies most sharply
diverge, U.S. corporate law has empowered boards to prioritize firm sustainability over returns to shareholders, and populist regard for employees has proven to be an extremely powerful force in bringing about this
outcome.
2. Financial Firms: Protecting “Depositors”
From a broad political perspective, similar dynamics have historically driven corporate governance in U.S. financial firms as well, though
given the distinct nature and economic role of these firms, the fundamen71. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A
Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1068, 1074–89 (2002).
72. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
73. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–53 (Del. 1990). Roe attributes Delaware’s takeover case law primarily to a perceived “threat of exodus” in the late 1980s
“unless Delaware joined the antitakeover bandwagon.” ROE, supra note 62, at 163–67. It bears emphasizing, however, that key opinions permitting regard for non-shareholders and use of poison pills
came down in the mid-1980s. See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955 (including the “constituencies”
language discussed above); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353–57 (Del. 1985)
(legitimating preemptive use of poison pills).
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tal aim of insulating average working people from destabilizing social
and economic shock has manifested itself differently. While it is the
“employee” conceptual category that best encapsulates the needs of average working people in the non-financial context, it is the “depositor”
category that best encapsulates their needs in the financial context. Similarly, while foreclosing hostile takeovers most clearly reflects the firm
sustainability norm in the non-financial context, foreclosing excessive
risk-taking most clearly reflects this norm in the financial context.74
Strong populist appeals to the perceived interests of average working people largely drove the financial firm corporate governance innovations described above, as Patricia McCoy has recognized in her work on
fiduciary duties in banking, and as Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller
similarly discerned in the advent of double liability rules.75 As one decision by the New York Court of Appeals somewhat dramatically explained in 1880,
[w]hat would be slight neglect in the care exercised in the affairs of
a turnpike corporation, or even of a manufacturing corporation,
might be gross neglect in the care exercised in the management of a
savings bank intrusted with the savings of a multitude of poor people, depending for its life upon credit and liable to be wrecked by
the breath of suspicion.76

Concerns for the welfare of average working people entrusting their savings to bank managers were similarly detectable in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey’s 1901 decision discussed above, in which the court
described “[b]anks of deposit and discount” as “quasi public institutions.” The court further stated that “the man who makes a deposit in [a]
bank” has “a right to rely upon the character of the directors and officers
of the bank, and that they will perform their sworn duty” to exercise
“such diligence and attention as experience has shown it is proper and
necessary . . . to reasonably protect the bank and its creditors against
loss.”77 Remarkably, the court emphatically rejected the notion that different rules might apply outside the context of a sophisticated financial
center. To the contrary,
[bank directors’] names give credit and standing to the institution,
and are a guarantee to dealers that its affairs will be conducted with
reasonable prudence and care and according to law. . . . I cannot
74. In drawing this distinction, it is worth adding that hostile takeovers have historically been
rare in U.S. banking. See, e.g., Adams & Mehran, supra note 23, at 126; Macey & O’Hara, supra
note 26, at 338.
75. See generally McCoy, supra note 30; Macey & Miller, supra note 33.
76. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880).
77. Campbell v. Watson, 50 A. 120, 124 (N.J. Ch. 1901).
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yield to the suggestion of some of the defendants’ counsel that the
fact that the institution in question was a small country bank relieved its directors from adopting the same practical measures for
protection against frauds and thefts as were in use by its greater
neighbors in larger towns.78

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the 1935 decision discussed above, similarly emphasized that the quality of bank management
itself constituted a form of public inducement to trust the institution with
one’s money, stating that
[bank directors] hold themselves out as having the superintendence
and management of all the concerns of the bank. They thereby engage to conduct its business as men of reasonable ability, necessary
intelligence and sound judgment ought to conduct it. . . . They invite
the confidence of the depositing public and must afford the protection thereby implied.79

As McCoy explains, the heightened standard of care demanded of
bank directors in such cases reflected “a populist concern for harm to
individual depositors” that could result from bank failures.80 “This populist image of depositors,” she observes, “was driven by concerns about
the devastating financial impact that lost savings would have on middleand lower-income Americans,” an image with extraordinary social and
political resonance “due to the pervasiveness of bank depositors in practically every walk of American life. There is no other industry where ordinary citizens so ubiquitously serve as lenders.”81 While cases demonstrating such regard for bank depositors were initially limited to certain
jurisdictions—notably Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
and Virginia—by the early 1930s “a majority of bank director negligence
cases subordinated potential profit maximization in favor of loss avoidance.” This involved “judicial assessments of risk and the ensuing judgment that risk levels were too high to merit protection under the business
judgment rule”—meaning greater reliance on the duty of care to protect
depositors and ensure stability in American banking.82
Similar populist impulses motivated double liability rules as well,
which aimed quite directly to protect depositors from excessive risk78. Id. at 125; see also Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501, 506–08 (Va. 1933) (citing Hun v.
Cary and Campbell v. Watson in support of a robust standard of care to protect depositors).
79. Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649, 655 (Mass. 1935).
80. See McCoy, supra note 30, at 38–40.
81. Id. at 73.
82. Id. at 38–43. With the advent of federal deposit insurance in 1933, concern for the welfare
of average working depositors merged with a more direct federal governmental interest in minimizing losses from bank failures. See id. at 40.
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taking. At the 1846 constitutional convention adopting New York’s influential double liability provision, its proponent, Churchill Cambreleng,
reportedly argued that “deposites in a bank were a trust fund as sacred as
any other obligation,” that “[w]ithout some responsibility in addition to
what we now had, we should have an unsafe system of banking,” and
that “we were bound to protect the community against their insolvency.”
In proposing double liability for bank shareholders, “[h]is object was to
place the banks on a perfectly sound footing; and every sound banker
should wish to see it so.” Indeed, Cambreleng “said he offered this section as a compromise,” and that he in fact “should have preferred unlimited responsibility himself.”83
When a similar provision was applied to national banks by statute
in the 1860s, its Senate proponent, John Sherman of Ohio, cited the New
York model and argued that bank depositors “should have something
more than the stock to fall back upon; and that if you provide a limited
liability to an amount equal to the stock, in addition to the stock, you will
make it ample beyond all danger”—an approach that he noted had already “been embodied in the laws of a great majority of the States.”84 A
year later, when clarifying amendments to the statute were made, Sherman added, “I think that individual liability tends to prevent the stockholders and directors of a bank from engaging in hazardous operations. I
never would be willing to surrender the general principle of individual
liability.” Responding to the argument that shareholders could simply be
left to “appoint good directors and managers of their institutions, or let
them lose their money,” Sherman replied, “[i]t is the depositors and creditors we want to secure.”85 Based on their historical review of the enforcement of double liability rules in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Macey and Miller conclude that these rules “fostered cautious banking practices on the part of bank managers who were either
themselves shareholders and always were subject to monitoring by
shareholders anxious to avoid the specter of assessment.”86

83. REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1846, REPORTED BY WILLIAM G. BISHOP AND
WILLIAM H. ATTREE 997–98 (1846) (paraphrasing comments of Churchill C. Cambreleng).
84. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 824 (1863) (reporting comments of Ohio Senator John
Sherman).
85. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1869–70 (1864) (reporting Senator Sherman’s response to arguments of Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson).
86. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 58. For additional discussion of their efficacy, see Jackson, supra note 59, at 921 (arguing that “the losses imposed on depositors in national banks that
failed during the 1930–34 period were much higher than those reported by Macey and Miller” in
their 1992 article); Macey & Miller, supra note 59, at 937 (responding that “the conclusion that
depositors would have been worse off without double liability seems impossible to refute”).
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Each of these deviations from the traditional corporate architecture—imposing heightened fiduciary duties on directors and personal
liability on shareholders—were consciously aimed at protecting “depositors,” a stakeholder group thought to represent the interests of average
working people. This reflects the same populist impulse that has led to
the protection of “employees” in non-financial contexts under U.S. corporate law. Although the manifestation of this social and political force
has taken a different form in the financial context, this simply reflects the
differing economic role and nature of financial firms and resulting differences in how we conceptualize the relevant corporate stakeholders in
these firms. These differences, as we have seen, led corporate law to favor divergent corporate governance structures in financial and nonfinancial contexts but toward the same fundamental goal—social and
economic stability for average working people.
III. SHAREHOLDER CENTRISM AND POPULIST POLITICS IN THE WAKE OF
THE CRISIS
Fast-forward to the present day, in which we look back upon a catastrophic financial and economic crisis widely ascribed to reckless financial firm managers. In light of the foregoing historical account emphasizing corporate governance innovations aimed at curtailing risk-taking in
banks, the questions we face appear all the more vexing. What exactly
went wrong? More specifically, what was the role of corporate governance in the run-up to the current crisis? And how have populist social
and political dynamics expressed themselves in post-crisis reform efforts?
Many have observed that, over the last several decades, the inherent
challenges of financial firm management have grown substantially as
financial firms and financial products alike have become larger, more
complex, and increasingly opaque—the result being the tangled web of
mortgage-backed securities, and derivatives thereon, that rendered the
balance sheets of U.S. (and U.K.) financial firms effectively unintelligible.87 Far fewer have acknowledged, however, that corporate architectural strategies that historically constrained financial risk-taking were effectively marginalized, or discarded entirely, in parallel with those developments.88
As I discuss in this part of the Article, the trend over recent decades
toward full-service financial firms with publicly traded stock has placed
far greater emphasis on generating returns for financial firm shareholders
87. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 311–16 and sources cited therein.
88. Exceptions include those discussed below. See infra Part IV.
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while simultaneously blurring corporate law’s historical distinction between financial and non-financial firms. The predictable results have
been stronger incentives to engage in financial risk-taking and a weaker
capacity to limit it through corporate law.
A. Shareholder Centrism, Risk-Taking, and Financial Firms
Multiple liability for shareholders of national banks was abandoned
in the mid-1930s following the advent of deposit insurance, and the
states phased it out through the mid-1950s,89 effectively removing two
brakes that had previously curbed shareholders’ enthusiasm for risk—
multiple liability on the one hand and creditor incentives to monitor on
the other. To be sure, prudential regulation stepped in as a substitute, but
we might reasonably query the adequacy of this approach, not least given
the informational disadvantage under which external government regulators inevitably labor—which, of course, would only become more problematic as time passed. Beginning in the 1970s, commercial banks would
become larger, more complex, more competitive, and more stock pricedriven as regulations constraining their size, markets, and activities were
systematically dismantled.90 At the same time, investment banking firms
similarly broke from their historical moorings in partnership in the 1970s
and 1980s to become publicly traded corporations. This move strongly
reinforced the shareholder-centric ethos in contemporary finance and
further encouraged a culture of risk-taking.91 These trends merged in the
1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, permitting the rise of the full-service
financial holding company engaged in both investment and commercial
banking that now defines modern American finance.92
One might have expected fiduciary duties to loom all that much
larger in the modern financial landscape given the enormous economic
reach and significance of these firms and the systemic risks they can im89 . See John R. Vincens, On the Demise of Double Liability of Bank Shareholders, 75
BANKING L.J. 213, 214–16 (1958); see also Leonard, supra note 59, at 524–25.
90. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 311–13.
91. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text; see also Malcolm S. Salter, How ShortTermism Invites Corruption . . . . And What to Do About It 10–12, 17–18 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 12-094, 2012), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/7015.html; Matt Schifrin, Jamie Dimon’s
Folly: Shareholders Over Customers, FORBES (May 16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/schifrin/
2012/05/16/jamie-dimons-folly-shareholders-over-customers/.
92. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 313. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act amended the Bank Holding Company Act to permit a bank holding company “to declare itself a financial holding company . . . and thereby engage in financial activities, including securities underwriting and dealing,
insurance agency and underwriting activities, and merchant banking activities.” The Federal Reserve
suggests that “it is useful to think of an FHC as a hybrid form of BHC that has additional authority to
make financial investments.” See Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies,
PARTNERSHIP FOR PROGRESS, http://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/grow-shareholdervalue/bank-holding-companies.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
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pose upon society at large. Yet, the fact that heightened common law
duties of care and loyalty continue to apply in banks themselves93 does
not mean these heightened duties will apply in financial holding companies—the corporate level where broader risk-management challenges and
associated public welfare concerns now loom largest. As of December
2011, JPMorgan Chase, the largest U.S. financial holding company, had
consolidated assets of $2.266 trillion.94 To put that number in crude perspective, it exceeds the gross domestic product (GDP) of all but five
countries on Earth; it is roughly equivalent to U.K. GDP, and it amounts
to about fifteen percent of U.S. GDP.95 The top five financial holding
companies—JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs—total $8.514 trillion,96 or about fifty-six percent
of U.S. GDP. 97 These institutions are enormous, and it is exceedingly
difficult to monitor their far-flung and diverse financial businesses effectively. When things go wrong, then, and managers find themselves facing Delaware shareholder suits,98 Delaware’s judges cut them considerable slack. Applying not some finance-specific conception of the requisite
care, but rather the monitoring standard now applied to all publicly traded Delaware corporations, directors are deemed to have discharged their
93. See MCCOY, supra note 33, § 14.04. The Federal Reserve reports that “about 84 percent of
commercial banks in the U.S. are part of a BHC structure. More than 75 percent of small banks with
assets of less than $100 million are owned by BHCs; this percentage increases to 100 percent for
large banks with more than $10 billion in assets.” Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding
Companies, supra note 92.
94. See Top 50 HCs, FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov/
nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx (last updated Sept. 30, 2012).
95. See National Income and Product Accounts: Gross Domestic Product, 4th Quarter 2011
and Annual 2011 (third estimate); Corporate Profits, 4th Quarter 2011 and Annual 2011, BUREAU
ECON. ANALYSIS (Mar. 29, 2012), [hereinafter National Income and Product Accounts]
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2012/gdp4q11_3rd.htm (reporting U.S. GDP of
$15.319 trillion for the fourth quarter); Gross Domestic Product 2010, WORLD BANK (July 1, 2011),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (indicating that only the
United States, China, Japan, Germany, and France were higher, while U.K. GDP was $2.246 trillion).
96. See Top 50 HCs, supra note 94.
97. See National Income and Product Accounts, supra note 95.
98. The top five U.S. financial holding companies are all Delaware corporations with common
stock trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
19617/000001961712000163/corp10k2011.htm (NYSE: JPM); Bank of America Corp., Annual
Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
70858/000007085812000155/bac-12312011x10k.htm (NYSE: BAC); Citigroup Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/
000120677412000799/citigroup_10k.htm (NYSE: C); Wells Fargo & Co., Annual Report (Form 10K) (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000119312
512084528/d280360d10k.htm (NYSE: WFC); The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K) (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886982/0001193125
12085822/d276319d10k.htm (NYSE: GS).
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duty to monitor in good faith so long as some type of monitoring system
was in place. As the Court of Chancery explained in its well-known
Caremark decision, “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board
to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish the lack
of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”99 This is an exceptionally difficult standard for plaintiffs to meet, as shareholders of
Citigroup and Goldman Sachs learned to their chagrin when they sought
damages in Delaware for their managers’ alleged failures to heed “red
flags” in the housing and mortgage-backed securities markets.100 It would
appear that even JPMorgan Chase’s much-heralded risk-management
systems have proven insufficient to keep a lid on the global trading operations of such a mammoth institution, as the breach of the “London
Whale” and resulting multi-billion-dollar trading losses have so vividly
demonstrated. 101 Short of a finding of outright fraud, however, Delaware’s corporate fiduciary duties will have little if any role to play in the
matter.102
99. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (endorsing the Caremark standard for oversight cases). While styling oversight as a matter of the “good faith” component of loyalty, as opposed to care,
benefits plaintiffs by permitting such claims to overcome exculpatory charter provisions, the Caremark standard is rightly said to be exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to meet. See Bainbridge, supra
note 27, at 975–76; see also Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith in Revlon-Land, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 581, 584–91 (2010–2011); Bruner, supra note 51, at 1157–59. On the difficulty of enforcing the
duty to monitor in the United Kingdom, see Simon Deakin, What Directors Do (and Fail to Do):
Some Comparative Notes on Board Structure and Corporate Governance, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
525 (2010–2011).
100. See generally In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch.
2009); In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. Shareholder Litig., Civ. No. 5215-VCG, 2011 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 151 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011); see also Bainbridge, supra note 27; Johnson, supra note 27, at
78–92; Renee M. Jones & Michelle Welsh, Toward a Public Enforcement Model for Directors’ Duty
of Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 343, 356–63 (2012); Salter, supra note 91, at 3–6.
101. Bruno Iksil, a London-based trader in JPMorgan Chase’s Chief Investment Office (CIO),
reportedly “amassed positions in securities linked to the financial health of corporations that were so
large he was driving price moves in the $10 trillion market.” The fallout from multi-billion-dollar
losses on his trades has “shattered JPMorgan’s cultivated reputation for policing risk and undermined [CEO Jamie] Dimon’s authority as a critic of regulatory efforts to curb speculation by toobig-to-fail banks.” See Dawn Kopecki & Max Abelson, Dimon Fortress Breached as Push From
Hedging to Betting Blows Up, BLOOMBERG (May 14, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-05-14/dimon-fortress-breached-as-push-from-hedging-to-betting-blows-up.html; see also Peter
Coy, The Hubris of Jamie Dimon, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 17, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-16/the-hubris-of-jamie-dimon; Tim Mak, Elizabeth
Warren: Dimon Should Quit N.Y. Fed, POLITICO (May 15, 2012), http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/0512/76265.html; Scott Patterson, Dimon: J.P. Morgan Loss ‘Terrible, Egregious
Mistake,’ WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023
04192704577402102196099694.html.
102 . See Bob Van Voris, JPMorgan Shareholders Sue Dimon Over $2 Billion Loss,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-
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While as recently as 2009 the empirical literature on financial firm
corporate governance remained surprisingly thin, the nascent post-crisis
literature does tend to suggest that risk-taking to boost financial firm
stock prices must figure centrally in any coherent narrative of the crisis.
We already knew from studies of non-financial firms that strong shareholder orientation is associated with greater risk-taking103 and that bond
premiums rise as management equity ownership rises (suggesting greater
perceived risk among bondholders).104 Conversely, “CEOs who are insulated from shareholder pressure and do not receive high-powered pay are
less prone to engage in risk-taking.”105 Thus, it is hardly surprising that a
growing body of post-crisis empirical studies tends to associate equitybased pay and greater shareholder orientation with greater risk-taking in
financial firms in the run-up to the crisis.106 For example, Renee Adams
found that banks receiving bailout funds under the TARP program “have
more independent boards, larger boards, more outside directorships and
greater incentive pay for CEOs.”107 Rüdiger Fahlenbrach and René Stulz
similarly found that “banks led by CEOs whose interests were better
aligned with those of their shareholders had worse stock returns and a
worse return on equity” during the crisis—evidence perhaps suggesting
16/jpmorgan-shareholders-sue-dimon-over-2-billion-trading-loss.html (reporting the filing of securities fraud and derivative suits); see also Stephen Bainbridge, JP Morgan’s Caremark Exposure,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 13, 2012), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbain
bridgecom/2012/05/jp-morgans-caremark-exposure.html (arguing, in light of the Caremark and
Citigroup decisions, “that—assuming the existence of an adequate monitoring system—liability only
arises where there is ‘a sustained or systematic failure’ on the board’s part to respond to red flags
that are numerous, serious, directly in front of the directors, and indicative of a corporate-wide problem,” effectively meaning a failure to monitor “so inexplicable that no other explanation [than] bad
faith or disloyalty makes sense”).
In July 2012, JPMorgan disclosed that its losses on the trades had grown to $5.8 billion following an internal investigation suggesting that “traders recorded the value of their trades at current
market prices, rather than prices they would get if they liquidated their large positions, in an effort to
avoid reporting their full paper losses.” Probes were initiated in the United Kingdom by the Financial Services Authority, and in the United States by the FBI, the SEC, the CFTC, the FDIC, the
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Reuters reported that
“regulatory and legal consequences will linger for some time. Blame for the problems at the CIO
office may go further up the management chain to some of the most senior executives at the firm,
lawyers said.” David Henry & Aruna Viswanatha, U.S. Investigates Whether JPMorgan Traders Hid
Losses, REUTERS (July 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/13/us-jpmorgan-earningsidUSBRE86C0G420120713.
103. See Kose John et al., Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking, 63 J. FIN. 1679, 1708
(2008). For a discussion of the lack of empirical support for the claim that shareholder centrism
improves corporate performance more generally, see STOUT, supra note 16, at 47–60.
104. See Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation
for Risk Regulation, 105 NW U. L. REV. 1205, 1217 n.60 (2011).
105. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 262
(2010).
106. See Deakin, supra note 17, at 341–43, 379.
107. Adams, supra note 23, at 13.
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that “CEOs focused on the interests of their shareholders in the build-up
to the crisis and took actions that they believed the market would welcome.”108 Conversely, Frederick Tung and Xue Wang found that “bank
CEOs’ inside debt holdings preceding the Crisis are significantly positively associated with better stock returns and accounting return on assets,” and significantly negatively associated with risk-taking.109
In light of the foregoing, one might have expected corporate governance reforms aimed at insulating financial firm management from
equity market pressures and associated risk incentives. Indeed, even
some of the most committed academic proponents of shareholder-centric
corporate governance have acknowledged that, whatever the merits of
their arguments in the non-financial context may be, it is a recipe for excessive risk in the unique context of financial firms.110 Yet, post-crisis
reforms in the United States (as in the United Kingdom) have aimed to
empower shareholders further in financial and non-financial contexts
alike.
B. Post-Crisis Populism
How do we explain these apparently anomalous developments? As
we have seen, populism has played a critical role in the evolution of U.S.
corporate governance in both financial and non-financial firms. While
this has typically militated in favor of “employees” in non-financial firms
and “depositors” in financial firms, in some instances populist politics
have cut differently. Consider, for example, the shift in risk-management
strategy from double shareholder liability to deposit insurance starting in
the 1930s. To be sure, this was substantially prompted by the view that
only a rock-solid U.S. government guarantee could halt a banking crisis
of that magnitude.111 This shift in approach was reinforced, however, by
populist regard for small shareholders, many of whom were thought to
108. Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15212, 2009); see also Laeven & Levine, supra note
23, at 273 (finding that “banks with more powerful owners tend to take greater risks”); Andrea
Beltratti & René M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit Crisis?: A CrossCountry Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 15180, 2009) (finding that “banks with more pro-shareholder boards performed
worse during the crisis”).
109. Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Global
Financial Crisis 4 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-49, 2011).
110. Compare, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675 (2007) (advocating stronger shareholder powers in the non-financial context), with
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 105 (arguing that, in order to reduce risk-taking, compensation in
banks should not focus narrowly on aligning managers’ interests with those of common shareholders).
111. See Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 38–39; see also Leonard, supra note 59, at 524–25;
Vincens, supra note 89, at 214.
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have bought bank stock during the 1920s, unmindful of the obligations
they were taking on, only to find themselves facing financial ruin with
the onset of the Great Depression. As a 1958 article in the Banking Law
Journal assessing “the demise of double liability” expressed it,
[e]ven where assessments could be collected, they often fell as a calamity upon the businessmen of an already stricken community. Not
infrequently they were imposed after a shareholder had departed
this world, and the burden of payment was thus thrust upon his widow and children.112

Thus, in some circumstances, populist regard for the interests of average
working people can cut in favor of corporate shareholders as well.
That, in essence, is what we observe in the wake of this most recent
crisis, though for reasons that ought to trouble us. U.S. reform initiatives
in the wake of the crisis have been replete with expressions of sympathy
for the American “middle class”—an amorphous concept effectively
standing for the investment-related and social welfare-related interests of
the average working family, including the security of savings for education and retirement as well as the stability of employer-based healthcare
arrangements. Among other things, this has taken the form of targeted
political initiatives like Senator Charles Schumer’s proposed “Shareholder Bill of Rights Act,” which, if enacted, would have included a raft
of shareholder-friendly reforms, including clear authority for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish a proxy access regime; “say on pay” (and golden parachute) votes; and exchange listing
rules requiring independent board chairs, as well as annual board elections with majority, rather than plurality, voting.113 By way of justification for such reforms, Senator Schumer’s bill claimed that “among the
central causes of the financial and economic crises . . . has been a widespread failure of corporate governance,” and that “a key contributing factor . . . was the lack of accountability of boards to their ultimate owners,
the shareholders.” The stakes for the middle class, then, are emphasized
in the further claim that “such failure has led to the loss of trillions of
dollars in shareholder value, losses that have been borne by millions of
Americans who are shareholders” not only through “direct investments,”
but also “through their pension plans [and] 401(k) plans.”114 The clear
aim is to direct the ire of middle-class voters—whether seeing them-

112. Vincens, supra note 89, at 214; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 37.
113. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. §§ 3–5. Some of these proposals were ultimately included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act. See infra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
114. S. 1074 § 2.
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selves primarily as “shareholders” or “employees”—against purportedly
reckless and unaccountable management.
In a similar spirit, President Obama’s “Middle Class Task Force”
(led by Vice President Biden) was created to promote a broad range of
initiatives including not only financial reforms culminating in the DoddFrank Act, but also health insurance reforms aimed at expanding coverage to tens of millions of previously uninsured Americans.115 In 2009,
the Middle Class Task Force described the broader regulatory “challenge
we face” as being “to reconnect the living standards of middle-class families to the economic growth they themselves are creating”116—a framing
of the task that would ultimately allow reformers to link the security of
middle-class working families not only with stronger social welfare protections, but also with shareholder-centric governance reforms (and, implicitly, the marginalization of parasitic management). In each instance,
the overarching theme of “middle class” security has effectively functioned to merge traditional “shareholder” and “employee” interests in a
powerful anti-manager political coalition, dovetailing nicely with the
management-recklessness narrative that has dominated press accounts of
the crisis.117
It is entirely comprehensible that post-crisis reforms would aim to
alleviate widespread social welfare concerns. What is troubling is the
notion that shareholder empowerment is somehow intrinsically bound up
with the interests of the American middle class—a claim resting on
flawed premises. Aside from the fact that recent research on the demographics of American shareholding tends to contradict any direct association with middle-class interests, 118 the claimed conceptual link is
difficult to establish even in the context where “shareholder” and “em115. See Middle Class Task Force, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/strong
middleclass (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
116 . MIDDLE CLASS TASK FORCE, THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT:
HELPING MIDDLE-CLASS FAMILIES 5 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/doc
uments/staff_report_ARRA-FINAL.pdf.
117. See Bruner, supra note 26, at 316, 336–39. Mark Roe presciently anticipated the potential
for such a development, observing in 1994 that “[a]nti-finance ‘populism’ is not what it once was as
a political force.” He elaborates that “if the political contest is seen as pitting responsible institutions
against greedy managers, we could imagine the resulting rules as not hurting shareholder activism
badly. The attention to managerial salaries in the media suggests that modern 1990s’ ‘populism’ can
target managers as well as institutions.” ROE, supra note 62, at 285.
118. Based on Federal Reserve and IRS data, William Bratton and Michael Wachter “show
that even as shareholding has diffused downward to lower income individuals the shareholders’
overall socio-economic status has remained largely unchanged.” Bratton and Wachter conclude that
“there is nothing inherently democratic or progressive about the shareholder interest in corporate
politics.” See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 491 (2013). On the heterogeneity of shareholder preferences, see STOUT,
supra note 16, at 9–10, 63–94.
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ployee” interests seem most directly to merge—pension fund investments. For example, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar, in a June 2012
speech to the National Association of Public Pension Attorneys, spoke of
“how public pension funds, in their capacity as shareowners and investors, can be a more effective voice for America’s working families.”
Specifically, Aguilar suggests that, “[a]s fiduciaries, public pension
plans can be a powerful voice on behalf of their beneficiaries, working
men and women whose voices are often drowned out.”119 He does not,
however, spell out precisely how he envisions this working in practice. If
the idea is that public pension funds advance the interests of working
families through pursuit of political agendas unrelated to generating returns, as some believe they are wont to do, then this would presumably
conflict with the state law duties their trustees owe to the funds’ beneficiaries.120 If, on the other hand, as Aguilar claims, the idea is that public
pension funds foster stability because they “typically invest with a longterm perspective” representing “patient capital” counteracting “a capital
markets environment that is often all too focused on quarterly returns,”121
then the rationale stands in tension with the clear trend in recent years.
While Aguilar acknowledges that pension fund returns have fallen
over the last decade, and that “the gap between asset values and projected liabilities has widened, leading to long-term concerns about sustainability,”122 he does not mention that this has already led public pension
funds to focus increasingly on short-term returns in exactly the manner
that he (rightly) decries.123 While the effort to ensure that current obligations are met may help maintain working families’ near-term confidence,
it hardly contributes to the long-term stability of the retirement systems
119. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Pension Funds as Owners and Investors: A Voice for Working Families, Keynote Address to the National Association of Public Pension
Attorneys 2012 Legal Education Conference (June 27, 2012), available at , http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2012/spch062712laa.htm (emphasis added).
120. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REV. 561, 588–89 (2006).
121. See Aguilar, supra note 119.
122. Id.
123. See David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911 (2013).
Institutional investors’ growing emphasis on short-term returns also reflects more active trading and
correlatively shorter holding periods. See Salter, supra note 91, at 12–13 (observing “the rapidly
declining costs of trade in equities and the corresponding rise of ‘hyperspeed’ traders” who now
represent “as much as 70 percent of all trade in U.S. equities,” and who “have zero interest in an
investment’s long-term value”); see also STOUT, supra note 16, at 66–67 (“[I]n 1960, annual share
turnover for firms listed on the [NYSE] was only 12 percent. . . . By 1987, this figure had risen to 73
percent. By 2010, the average annual turnover for equities listed on U.S. exchanges reached an
astonishing 300 percent annually, implying an average holding period of only four months.”). As
Malcolm Salter emphasizes, these trends are exacerbated by the practice of issuing “earnings guidance,” which further focuses the minds of analysts and management alike on quarterly stock price
performance. See Salter, supra note 91, at 13–15, 22.
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on which they will ultimately depend or the long-term stability of corporate employers and the financial system. Indeed, if Aguilar’s idea is that
public pension funds are well positioned to reduce risk-taking of the sort
that led to the crisis—as he implicitly suggests in citing reforms in the
Dodd-Frank Act “intended to help empower shareholders to exercise
their rights . . . and to make sure that a company’s directors and officers
are living up to their responsibility to act as prudent stewards of the assets entrusted to them”124—then this plainly conflicts with the empirical
literature discussed above (particularly in light of public pension funds’
increasingly short-term investment horizons). 125 Asserting that shareholders speak “for America’s working families” may make for powerful
rhetoric, but the claim fails to withstand even moderate scrutiny.126
There is simply no reason to believe that stronger shareholders
would have mitigated risk-taking in the run-up to the crisis or could be
expected to do so moving forward, and the resulting contradictions of the
post-crisis shareholder empowerment agenda are readily apparent in reform efforts on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United Kingdom, for
example, the Walker Report’s analysis of financial firm corporate governance rightly acknowledges that shareholders may have supported
greater leverage for “the very high returns that could be generated,” and
that short-term equity market pressures “in many cases led to both encouragement and greater acceptance of increased leverage.” Yet, Walker
suggests that shareholders could be expected to act as responsible “stewards,” pressuring bank managers to focus on the long-term. This is an
odd suggestion given Walker’s expression of hope that greater exposure
to management might be the mechanism by which to “moderate shareholder focus on short-term performance.”127

124. See Aguilar, supra note 119.
125. See supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text.
126. Aguilar further suggests that “when [pension fund] beneficiaries spend their paychecks,
they support local business owners and other segments of the economy, providing, in effect, a stimulus to business revenues and helping to generate economic demand and employment.” Aguilar, supra note 119. In itself, however, this has no direct bearing on the issue of how much governance
power shareholders ought to possess.
127. DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN U.K. BANKS AND OTHER
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 13, 25–27 (2009), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_2611
09.pdf; see also Financial Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code (2010) (implementing
Walker’s recommendation through a code for institutional shareholders enforced on a “comply or
explain” basis). For additional background on the Walker Report and the UK Stewardship Code, see
Bruner, supra note 26, at 318–19.
Other post-crisis reform initiatives advocating greater shareholder powers in financial firms reflect essentially the same contradiction. See, e.g., GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 27, at 70–74;
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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This contradiction is just as glaring in the United States, where
more fundamental initiatives to strengthen shareholders are afoot—most
notably through the Dodd-Frank Act, which includes say-on-pay (and
golden parachute) votes, enhanced disclosures on “the relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the issuer,” and clear authority for the SEC to enact a proxy
access regime.128 How any of this is supposed to reduce risk-taking remains entirely unclear—though the Dodd-Frank Act also requires risk
committees in certain larger financial firms and imposes additional regulation for incentive-based pay in financial firms that regulators believe
“could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution.”129
The joint efforts of seven financial regulators to implement this requirement, however, have only further demonstrated the lack of a coherent overarching reform strategy. In April 2011, these regulators jointly
proposed rules that would require firms with over $1 billion in assets to
“balance risk and financial rewards” in setting compensation. Exactly
how firms are supposed to do this remains unclear, though illustrative
options include deferral (required for firms with over $50 billion in assets), as well as “risk adjustment of awards, reduced sensitivity to shortterm performance, or longer performance periods.” The fact that we lack
a clear sense of how to “balance risk and financial rewards” in enormous
financial institutions facing an increasingly shareholder-centric corporate
governance framework is tacitly acknowledged, however, when the regulators emphasize that their suggestions “are not exclusive, and additional
methods or variations of these approaches may exist or be developed.”
They add that methods “for making compensation sensitive to risk-taking
are likely to evolve during the next few years.”130 Effectively, the combined thinking of seven financial regulators, comprising fifty pages of
the Federal Register, amounts to little more than a directive to reduce
risk-taking. How, exactly, is that to be done? “We don’t know,” our
regulators implicitly reply. “You figure it out.” In the meantime, howev-
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er, Congress works at cross purposes by rendering these financial institutions more directly answerable to risk-preferring shareholders.131
That we would respond to a crisis thought to have resulted from excessive financial risk by empowering the corporate constituency most
strongly favoring financial risk reflects just how narrow and ossified our
conception of the social and economic purpose of financial institutions
has become in recent decades. As described above, generating returns for
financial firm shareholders has increasingly crowded out all other interests, and this cramped conception of the purpose of financial firms has
greatly constrained our sense of the possible in the wake of the crisis.
Armed with a diminished vocabulary for describing the relationship between corporate governance and financial risk—and correlatively, a
much smaller conceptual toolbox for constraining excessive risk-taking
through corporate law—we have found ourselves unable to tackle a set
of problems requiring the ability to think creatively about how the corporate architecture ought to be structured.
Widespread popular belief that shareholder interests represent the
ultimate aim of the corporation renders it considerably more difficult to
perceive and grapple with those circumstances where the shareholders—
or at least their incentives—are themselves a substantial part of the problem. While shareholder-wealth maximization never has, and does not
currently, represent the singular legal purpose of corporations in the
United States, that is only partly relevant because if enough people believe that it does, then it can be expected to constrain the politics of corporate governance reform moving forward. This form of self-fulfilling
prophecy has clearly been at work in the wake of the crisis, the result to
131. Cf. Adams & Mehran, supra note 23, at 136 n.5 (“In theory, there is a conflict between
the objectives of regulators—safety and soundness—and those of shareholders—value maximization. When a conflict exists between value maximization and the need to support prudent operations,
regulators expect [bank] boards to balance these concerns effectively. . . . Little is known as to how
these conflicts affect the ability of top management and boards of directors to serve these potentially
divergent interests.”).
That the financial community has no idea what to make of all this—or what its effect on risktaking will prove to be—is evident from a recent survey of financial-services executives prompted
by such reforms. The survey of “almost 90 senior human resource executives at leading financial
services companies,” conducted by Towers Watson, found that “companies are evenly divided on
the impact that the current regulatory environment is having on risk taking in the industry.” While
half of those polled “said pay structure regulations have had at least a moderate impact,” the other
half “see little or no impact on risk taking in their organizations resulting from the recent regulations.” See Pay Regulation Prompting Financial Services Companies to Sharpen Their Focus on
Talent, Towers Watson Poll Finds, TOWERS WATSON (June 18, 2012), http://www.towerswat
son.com/united-states/press/7327. Just seven percent thought “the new regulatory structure has had a
significant impact,” and just seven percent thought that “pay structure regulation has fundamentally
changed the industry’s approach to risk taking.” Id. This lack of consensus is entirely predictable
given the lack of clarity in the proposed rules regarding how risk and financial reward are to be
balanced.
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date being a series of shareholder-centric reforms that, if anything, are
more likely to cause further crises than prevent them.
IV. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING CORPORATE PURPOSE IN FINANCIAL FIRMS
While a comprehensive reckoning of the causes and consequences
of the crisis has yet to emerge, it is increasingly clear that excessive risktaking to boost the stock prices of financial firms must play a central role
in any coherent explanation. Wide-ranging financial reforms will be required to address the numerous regulatory failures that contributed to the
crisis, 132 and identifying effective reforms—let alone implementing
them—will understandably take time. Nevertheless, we can and should
begin to direct our attention to corporate governance-driven risk incentives in a meaningful way. Sooner or later that will require revisiting the
fundamental issue of whether shareholder interests and incentives really
constitute a socially beneficial touchstone for corporate governance in
financial firms.
Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara, writing in 2003, presciently
observed that “[p]erhaps the most acute corporate governance problem
that banks face is the incentive of shareholders to transfer wealth to
themselves from fixed claimants such as depositors and government insurers by increasing the riskiness of the business.” Accordingly, they
argued for reinvigoration of fiduciary duties in the financial context as a
check on risk-taking and specifically that “focus[ing] attention on one
particular non-shareholder constituency—fixed claimants—appears to be
a superior corporate governance model for the banking industry.”133 In a
similar spirit, others have argued that we need to reinvigorate shareholder liability as a check on risk-taking. Peter Conti-Brown, for example,
has advocated an elective regime under which shareholders in systemically important banks could choose either to expose themselves to double
liability or to expose the bank to heightened capital requirements. 134
Claire Hill and Richard Painter have likewise advocated resurrecting personal liability for investment bankers—either through contract or through
assessable stock.135
Proposals like these are well worthy of consideration, and of course
they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, as the foregoing discussion
demonstrates, all of these proposals have direct antecedents in U.S. corporate law, which historically responded to the unique challenges of fi132. For a detailed overview of numerous contributing factors, see ROBERT POZEN, TOO BIG
TO SAVE? HOW TO FIX THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2010).

133. Macey & O’Hara, supra note 26, at 326, 340.
134. See generally Conti-Brown, supra note 59.
135. See generally Hill & Painter, supra note 60.
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nancial firm corporate governance with innovations aimed directly at
those aspects of the traditional corporate architecture tending to incentivize excessive risk-taking. What these various proposals have in common
is a refreshing willingness and ability to think creatively about corporate
architecture—to critique and re-conceptualize those structural aspects of
the modern corporation that demonstrably ran amok in the recent crisis.136
This commonality, however, points toward a fundamental and
pressing social and political problem, which is precisely that the marketplace, as well as our legislators, regulators, and judges, now effectively
lack this creative capacity, having lost sight of the underlying corporatepurpose debate toward which such proposals gesture. For over a century,
our misgivings regarding shareholders were at their greatest in the financial context and for good reasons. It is the context in which we ought to
be most concerned about allowing the shareholders’ preference for risk
to go unchecked. Yet, if anything, we seem to have swung to the opposite extreme over recent decades and find ourselves paying a heavy price
for it.
Until we firmly combat the growing popular misconception that financial firms exist merely to maximize stock price for the benefit of their
shareholders, we will at best fail to address the core problem and at worst
endure similar crises in the future. Only a broader conception of corporate purpose can provide the intellectual grounding for truly effective risk
reduction in U.S. financial firms. Unfortunately, our recent reform politics suggest that further crises may be what it takes to drive this lesson
home.
136. While I emphasize the structural creativity of such proposals, other risk-reduction strategies are clearly important and well worth pursuing in their own right—notably those aimed at reducing the effect of financial firm stock price on executive compensation. See, e.g., Bebchuk &
Spamann, supra note 105, at 283–85 (proposing “compensation based on the value of a broader
basket of securities representing a larger part of the corporate pie,” including common stock, preferred stock, and bonds); Tung, supra note 104, at 1226–41 (proposing compensation in the form of
the bank’s own “publicly traded subordinated debt”). Some proposals involve innovative design
features aimed at rendering the securities themselves more sensitive to the firm’s financial stability.
See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial
Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay 11–14 (Columbia Law Sch. & European Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 373, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633906
(proposing “compensation in the form of equity that will convert into subordinated debt upon certain
external triggering events” indicating financial distress); Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821, 1854–68 (2012) (proposing compensation in the
form of “contingent convertible bonds” triggered earlier than those held by investors in order “to
establish an early warning system that is independent of the capitalization needs of the entity”).
Others, meanwhile, have identified short-term pressures arising from entirely distinct areas of law.
See, e.g., Salter, supra note 91, at 23–26 (advocating further study of the potential to incentivize
long-term shareholding through favorable tax treatment of long-term capital gains).

